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POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF BUDGET DEFICITS
IN THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES
ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on the management of fiscal deficits and
the public debt in the industrial democracies. Given the large
deficits in many OECD countries in recent years, and the resulting
sharp rise in the public debt, it is important to determine the
economic and political forces leading to such large deficits. We
find only partial support for the "equilibrium approach to fiscal
policy", which assumes that tax rates are set over time in order
to minimize the excess burden of taxation. Tax rates do not seem
to be smoothed, and budget deficits in many countries in recent
years appear to be too large to be explained by appeal to
transitory increases in government spending. We suggest that in
several countries the slow rate at which the post-'73 fiscal
deficits were reduced resulted from the difficulties of political
management in coalition governments. There is a clear tendency for
larger deficits in countries characterized by a by a short average
tenure of government and by the presence of many political parties
in a ruling coalition.
Nouriel Roubini Jeffrey Sacha
Department of Economics Department of Economics
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New Haven, CT D6520 Cambridge, MA 02138It is only recently that mainstream macroeconomists have made an
important effort to formulate a positive theory of government behavior.
The traditional macroeconomics literature took government policy variables
to be exogenous, and examined the comparative statics effects of
alternative policy choices.More recently, normative rules of behavior
for government policy were derived based on structural macroeconomic
models combined with simply objective functions assigned to the
government.As a general rule, there was little interest in explaining
what governments actually did, but only interest in explaining what
governments ought to do in order to accomplish certain objectives.
Macroeconomists are now recognizing the need to explore more
carefully what governments actually do, rather than what they ought to do.
The first reason for this change of emphasis is simply the overwhelming
and ever-increasing role of the government in modern industrial economies.
For example, with the share of government spending in GNP now more than 40
percent in most OECD economies, up significantly from the early 1960s, it
is obviously of fundamental importance to understand the forces behind
actual government spending decisions.
Second, modern economic theory stresses that intertemporally
optimising individuals must form expectations about future government
policies as a key part of their decisionmaking process. In order to form
expectations, it is crucial to understand the nature of government
behavior in order to derive appropriate expectations about future
policies. If private agents are forming expectations over future
government policies, macroeconomists must do the same in order to get an
acceptable model of the macroeconomy.2
Third, many economists blame faulty macroeconomic policies for
the poor macroeconomic performance of much of the world economy since the
early l970s.A long and growing list of apparent policy failures (e.g.
the inflationary monetary policies in the industrial countries during the
1970s, the large budget deficits in the U.S. and elsewhere in the 1980s)
have led many economists to ask whether there are systematic biases in
government decisionmaking or political incentives that lead to poor
economic policies.
One important possibility, for example, explored in the
important contributions of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (l983a, l983b), is that optimal policies are time inconsistent, so
that actual government policies may deviate importantly from optimal
policies if governments cannot commit their future actions. This
literature has led to an important theoretical exploration of key ideas
such as the reputation of policymakers; the difference of "statutory"
versus"constitutional" limitations on policymaking;the role of
institutions (e.g. central bank independence) on economic outcomes, and so
on.
-
Ourpaper focuses on a specific, but important area of
macroeconomic policymaking: the management of fiscal deficits and the
public debt. Given the large deficits in many economies in recent years,
and the resulting sharp rise in the public debt, it is important to
determine the economic and political forces leading to such large
deficits. The basic data that motivates our exploration is given in Table
1. There we see the very sharp rise in the share of taxes and aggregate
spending in the national economies of the major industrial countries in3
the past 25 years, as veil as the large budget deficits in many of the
economies in recent years. (Here as elsewhere in the paper, our measure
of the budget deficit is not the financial balance of the general
government, as is typically reported, but rather change in the ratio
of net public debt to GDP).1 In three countries, Belgium, Ireland, and
Italy, the ratio of net debt to GDP has reached remarkable levels of
around 100 percent or more.
Our starting point of analysis is the so-called "equilibrium
approach to fiscal policy, which has been championed by Barro (1979, 1983,
1985, among other works), and recently summarized by Aschauer (1988).
This approach argues that actual tax and deficit policies are a reflection
of an intertemporal optimization over a long time horizon y the budgetary
authorities, who choose their policies to reduce the excess burden of
taxation for a given path of government spending. Jhile this viewpoint,
sometimes summarized as the 'tax smoothing" hypothesis of government
budgetary policy, offers some important insights, it does not fully
account for the differences in the magnitudes of budget deficits across
OECD economies in recent years. It also seems to be inconsistent with the
1. This choice of measure is motivated by several considerations.
First, it is the variable used by Barro and others in testing the tax-
smoothing hypothesis of St management. Second, the typically
reported measure of fir.al balances overstates the economically
relevant deficit by incUJing the inflation component of interest
payments on the public debt, which should be counted properly as a form
of debt repayment rather than a current budgetary expenditure.The
change in the net-debt-to-GNP ratio automatically adjusts for this
coaponent.Third, the long-run tax implications of current deficits
are best measured by looking at the net-debt-to-GNP ratio. Note that
to the extent that conventionally measured deficits are financed by
seignorage (i.e. the inflation tax) rather than by debt accumulation,
our measure will understate the deficit. Put another way, we
implicitly count seignorage as a form of taxation rather than as a form
of deficit financing.4
steady rise in tax rates in most of the OECD economies during the past two
decades.
Ourmaingoal is to demonstrate that differing institutional
arranaemep in the political process in the various OECD economies also
help to explain the markedly different patterns of budget deficits in the
different countries. Of course, the public choice approach to budgets
(as developed by James Buchanan and others), and the recent so-called
"partisanship theory" of policy-making, of Alesina, Havrilesky, Sachs,
Tabellini, and others, have also drawn our attention to aome of the
important political features of budget management, by recognizing the role
of political conflict in affecting budgetary policy. However, these
theories have not stressed enough the role of alternative political
institutions in mediating the effects of political conflict on budgetary
outcomes.
We wish to stress in our analysis that governments are not the
monolithic entities of standard economic models that have full control of
the policy instruments and that manage them according to a stable and
well-defined objective function. When power is dispersed, either across
branches of the government (as in the U.S.), or across many political
parties in a coalition government (as is typical in Italy), or across
parties through the alteration of political control over time, the
likelihood of intertemporally inefficient budgetary policy is heightened.
Thus, we find that the size and persistence of budget deficits in the
industrial countries in the past decade is greatest where there have been
divided governments (e.g. multi-party coalitions rather than majority-
party governments).5
Some basic support for this view is garnered in Table 2. There
we show the pattern of budget deficits during 1975-86, together with the
"typical' institutional form of the government, and the average tenure of
governments It is apparent that governments with large coalitions
and/or short tenures (e.g. Belgium, Italy, Sweden, and Denmark) are
characterized by particularly large average budget deficits in the past
decade.2While there are exceptions to this proposition (e.g. the
Netherlands, and Finland for reasons described in footnote 2 and later),
there are cases of long-lived governments (with an average tenure
greater than 3 years) showing an average annual change in the debt-GDP
ratio in excess of 3 percentage points during the period 1975-85.
The importance of the time-horizon of the gcvernment for budget
policy has recently been stressed in an important paper by Alesina and
Tabellini (1987). They emphasize that when political power alternates
randomly between competing political parties, each government will be
tempted to leave a legacy of high debt for its successor, whose spending
2.Later we will discuss a political classification scheme in
greater detail. Suffice it here to note that Finland and France
present certain ambiguities in classification, since they are mixed
parliamentary -presidentialsystems.In both cases, we treat them
more as presidential than as parliamentary systems, and therefore
expect them to show low budget deficits on average. In France, the
ambiguity in form is not highly problematical, since even as a
parliamentary system, France would be classified as a small coalition
case (with coalition partners that are typically rather similar in
ideology). In Finland, there is much greater problem, however.
Finnish coalition governments are typically multi-party, and extend
over a very wide ideological range.Therefore, in its parliamentary
aspect, the Finnish government has the kind of structure that seems to
give rise to large budget deficits in other countries. We believe that
the strong presidency overcomes many of the problems that would
otherwise arise.Some observers Stress that Finland has behaved more
like a presidential than parliamentary system in part because of the
personal political strength of the long-time president of the postwar
period, Mr. Kekkenon.6
priorities it is not likely to share. The high debt restrains the
spending by the next government, but the current government cares little
about the next government's spending in any case.Presumably, the more
rapid the turnover of government, the more important would be this deficit
bias effect.
We also stress the role of rapid turnover of governments, but
through a different channel. In our interpretation, the problem of
coalition governments is the inability to secure agreementsamong
coalition partners withina given government. The shorter is the expected
tenure of the government, the more difficult it may be to achieve
cooperation among the coalition partners (game theory establishes the
general point that cooperation is easier to maintain the longer is
expected time horizon over which agents will interact).
A word should be said at the beginning about the possibility of
reverse causality in the correlation that we are stressing. Might not
large and persistent budget deficits account for the weak and multi-party
character of some countries, rather than vice versa? This alternative
interpretation is in fact highly doubtful, since: (1) the regime character
depends intimately on the constitutional process (e.g. most importantly,
whether elections are governed by proportional representation, which tends
to produce short-lived multi-party coalition governments); (2) the regime
character is highly stable over time, and is little influenced by the
budgetary situation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II examines the
"equilibrium" approach to fiscal policy. While the theory offers
interesting insights, some key aspects of the theory are not supported by7
the data for several OECD economies. Section III sheds some light on the
origins of the large budget deficits after 1973 in many OECD economies.
We attribute the onset of large deficits to the growth slowdown and rise
in unemployment after 1973, as well as the sharp rise in real interest
rates after 1979.By the early 1980s, most governments recognized that
large budget deficits were likely to continue in the absence of majot
adjustments in spending and taxes, but only some countries (notably the
Germany, Japan, and the U.K. among the major economies) successfully
stabilized the ratios of public debt to GOP. Section IV suggests that the
success of fiscal consolidation has been importantly related to political
institutions.
Section II. The Equilibrium Model of Fiscal Policy
Our starting point of analysis is the equilibrium approach to
fiscal deficita. The equilibrium model is based on the following
assumptions: (1) the time path of future government spending is given, and
is known; (2) the discounted value of taxes is equal to the discounted
value of future government spending plus the initial stock of public debt;
(3)the time path of taxes has no effect on output via aggregate demand;
and (4) the excess burden of taxation is a convex function of the tax
rate.It is assumed that the government chooses taxes to minimize the
present discounted value of the deadweight burden of taxation.
Given these assumptions, it is easy to prove the celebrated "tax
smoothing" hypothesis, which holds that taxes are set at the fixed rate
that minimizes the intertemporal deadweight loss of the tax system.To
show this result, let G1, G2, G3, ... bethe exogenous time path of8
real government spending. GNP in period t is denoted by 'i'Let
g1, g2.
be the path of government spending relative to GNP, i.e. —
G/Y. LetT1,T2, T3, .
.. bethe time path of taxes, and let t, t2,
t3 be the time path of taxes relative to GNP (we will also call
the tax in period t). The real interest rate is given and (for
convenience only) is fixed at the rate r .Thestock of public debt in
real terms at the beginning of period t is denoted by B The public
debt evolves according to the dynamic budget constraint:
(1) —(1+ r) *B+ (G -T)
(G -T)is the primary budget deficit.We will denote the debt-GNP
ratio as b —
Thetaxes are assumed to be distortionary, with deadweight
losses per unit of GNP given by D(t), with D' > 0 and D'' > 0. The
governments intertemporal loss function as of period t is given by:
(2) L — (1+ r)1 D(tj) *
Under the assumptions of the equilibrium model, the goal of the government
as of period t is to find the time path of taxes which minimizes (2)
subject to the constraint that the discounted value of taxes equal the





—(1.+ r)B +E (l+r) 1G+. i0
It is straightforward to show that the first-order conditions for the
government's optimal tax program are simply:9
(4) D'(t+) —A for all i —0,1,2,...
where A is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the intertemporal
constraint that total taxes must equal total expenditure. From (4) it is
obvious that the tax rate should be set at a constant value across all
future time periods, consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint
in (3).
In a stochastic environment, the equivalent condition for
optimal tax smoothing is that the tax rate is a random walk without drift,
and that changes in the tax rate between period t-l and t are
unpredictable given the information set at time t-l.
To find the appropriate constant value of taxes for the model
(l)-(4), it is convenient to define the "permanent" level of government
spending relative to income as follows. Let ni be the compounded growth
rate of real GNP between period t and period t+i: — *(1+
n.)1.Then, the discounted value of government spending can be written as:
-i
(5) (l+r)Gt. — (1+r)''÷.
—(1+r)(1+n)i
I..etgP be the constant level of starting at time t such that the
discounted value of gP is the same as the discounted value of
the actual path of Specifically:
(6) gP — 1+n
I/ [Z(l+r) (l+n1)' I
Inthe special case where growth n is constant n, (6) reduces to the
simpler expression:10
(7) gP —[(r-n)/(l+r)) ([(l+r)/(l+n)]
Itis now straightforward to show that the appropriate constant
tax rate t is given as follows:
(8) t —(l+r)*a*b
+gP
-i i where a —E(l+r) (l+ni) In the case where the growth rate n
i—c
isconstant, we can write:
(9)t' —(r-n)bt +gP
The important implication of (8) and (9) is that the tax rate is optimally
set at the level of DerTnanent spending, plus a fraction of the interest
payment due on the outstanding stock of debt. It is then straightforward
to show that the change in the debt-GNP ratio may be written as follows




According to (10)the debt-GNP ratio is a function of the gap of
temporary and permanent government spending. When government spending is
above its permanent level, b rises, and when government spending is
below its permanent level, b falls.
Equation (10) is the basis for Barro's celebrated emphasis on
deficits and wartime. During wars, will greatly exceed gP, and debt
will rise. During peacetime, will tend to be less than gP (because
gP will included expected expenditures of future wars), and the debt-GNP11
ratio should fall.Barro has confirmed these basic trends for peacetime
and wartime for the U.S. and the U.K.
As another illustration of equations (9) and (10) ,considerthe
case in which government spending relative to GNP is rising each period,
as has been the case in several European countries.Suppose that
rises by the amount y each period, so that —+ i*-1
Then, permanent spending is always above temporary spending, by the amount
Therefore, we would find from (9) that taxes are always above
current government spending plus (r-n) b by the same amount:
(11) —g+(r-n)b +y/(r-n)
The debt-GNP ratio would always be falling, according to:
(12) b+i -b
—-[l/(1+n)]*y/(r-n)
The economic interpretation of (12) is as follows. In order to
minimize the excess burden of taxation, the tax rate should be held
constant, despite the constant rise in the rate of government spending.
ut how can this be done if government spending is constantly rising as a
proportion of CNP?Taxes should be set to generate a budget surplus,
leading to a declining ratio of debt to CNP, so that the interest payments
on the debt as a fraction of income fall over time, to compensate for the
constant rise in non-interest government expenditure.
Testing the Equilibrium Approach for the OECD Economies
The equilibrium approach stands in strong contrast to the
pessimistic forebodings of some economists (notably Buchanan and Tullock),12
who claim that there is a chronic tendency towards budget deficits in
representative democracies.The equilibrium view predicts falling debt-
GDP ratios during normal peacetime years.As shown in Table 3, the
prediction of falling b was strikingly confirmed for most industrial
countries during the period 1960 to 1973.Debt-GDP ratios fell in the
U.S. France, the U.K., Canada, Belgium during the period, or in 5 of the
7 countries with net debt data as far back as the mid-l960s. Only Italy
and Germany showed a contrary trend, and in the case of Germany, the level
of the net debt was negative or insignificant until the mid-1970s. Thus,
at least for the years 1960-73, there is little evidence of a chronic bias
towards deficits.
Even during the 1960 and early 1970s, however, the OECD fiscal
data are not wholly kind to the equilibrium model. While taxes are high
enough in most countries to result in a falling debt-CNP ratio, they are
decidedly high enough at any point in time to allow for smooth taxes
in the face of a rising rate of government spending.In particular, in
most countries, the share of government spending in GNP rises steadily,
and the share of taxes in GNP rises steadily alona side the higher share
of government spending. In other words, rather than being set in order to
smooth the tax rate, as in equation (11), taxes are set along a rising
path to keep them roughly aligned with government spending. As is shown
in Table 4, tax rates (measured as government revenues as a proportion of
GDP) rose quite markedly and steadily during 1960-73 in most countries,
and have in fact continued to rise steadily during the period 1973-1986.
The most direct statistical test of the tax-smoothing model is
to ask whether the observed path of tax rates is likely to have been13
generated by a mean-zero random walk, versus an alternative hypothesis in
which the changes in t have a constant non-zero drift. Table S reports
the regression results of the null hypothesis of a pure random walk for
tax ratea, first for the period 1960-73 and then for the overall period
1960-86.We test the shorter period first to make certain that our
results are not simply some artifact of the low-growth phase after 1973.
In the short sample, the null hypothesis of a driftlass random
walk in tax rates is rejected at the S percent level for 7 of the 12
countries for which tax data are available back to 1960. For the longer
sample, the null hypothesis is rejected for a whopping 12 out of 15
countries (the U.S., the U.K., and Finland being the only exceptions). It
is also rejected at the 10 percent level for the U.K. in the larger
sample. It would seem, therefore, that Barro's (1979,1981) earlier
results supporting the tax-smoothing model for the U.S. and the U.K. are
rather special cases. Note that for the U.S., Sahasakul (1985) has also
rejected the random-walk model for taxes. That rejection is not because
of a constant drift (as in our test), but instead because of the finding
that other variables help to predict future changes in U.S. tax rates.
The equilibrium theory's presumption of peacetime declines in
the debt-GNP ratio is turned on its head after 1973.Between 1973 and
1986, the net-debt-to-GDP ratio rose in 13 of 15 cases shown, with the
U.K. and Norway being the only exceptions.This is an extraordinary
turnabout for peacetime years. It is certainly possible that as the
likelihood of war fell sharply during the 1960s and 1970s for the European
countries, the estimation of gP fell as well, leading to a reduction in
the optimal peacetime surplus for these countries.But such a shift (if14
it could be proved) would hardly be sufficient to explain the dramatic
r.i.t in b in many countries. We are led, therefore, to ask whether
other shocks might have led to an excess of over during these
years that could explain the rise in debt consistently with the
equilibrium theory. Our answer is mixed. In the next section we identify
some important shocks (mainly the growth slowdown in the OECD after 1973
and the accompanying rise in unemployment) that probably raised
relative to it permanent level, at least for part of the period after
1973. On the other hand, the rate at which has declined relative to
its previous trend seems to have been too slow in many countries to
suggest that optimal tax smoothing is at work. As we have already noted,
taxes as a percent of GNP have trended upward rather strongly in most OECD
countries in the years after 1973.Moreover, the equilibrium approach
would appear to offer little explanation of the glaring fact that in some
countries (e.g. Germany, Japan, and the U.K.) the rise in the debt-GNP
ratio was stopped by the mid-198Os, while in other countries (e.g. Belgium
and Italy), the rise has continued. To help account for these
differences, we must turn to differences in political institutions.
Before examining the large post-1973 deficits, we test one
further implication of some versions of the equilibrium model. A minor
(and much less plausible) implication of the tax smoothing model involves
the government's choice over different kin of taxes. Recently, Mankiw
(1987) suggested that since inflationary finance is one kind of tax (to-
wit, a tax on real money balances), and since the goal of the tax
authorities is to minimize the overall excess burden of taxation, a rising
path of total revenues relative to GDP should be met by a rise both in15
explicit tax rates and a rise in the inflation tax (the efficiency rule is
that the various taxes should be levied to the point where the deadweight
loss per dollar of marginal revenue is equalized across the available
array of taxes) . Mankiwtests this proposition by examining the
correlation of explicit tax rates with the inflation rate (which is taken
as a proxy of the tax rate on real money balances). Using U.S. data, he
finds a positive and significant correlation, in support of the underlying
hypothesis.
In Table 6, we extend Mankiw's test to the other industrial
countries in our sample, by regressing the inflation rate on the average
rate of taxation. The hypothesis finds no general support. For 12 of the
15 countries, we find no significant relationship, and in five of the
countries (France, Austria, Italy, Ireland, and Denmark), the sign of the
regression coefficient is wrong (inflation and tax rates are negatively
correlated) .Weconfirm Mankiw's result for the U.S., and also find
supportive results as well for Finland and the Netherlands.
III. The Post-1973 Rise in Budget Deficits in the OECD
Our basic interpretation of the emergence of large budget
deficits in the OECD after 1973 is on the whole consistent with the
equilibrium viewpoint. The sudden and sharp increase in budget deficits
after 1973 can be linked directly to the sudden slowdown in OECD growth
and the corresponding sudden rise in unemployment after 1973. These
shocks increased on what appeared to be a cyclical basis, and so the
3. In a recent paper Poterba and Rotemberg (1988) perform similar tests
for 5 OECD countries and provide further evidence against the optimal
theory of seignorage.16
shocks increased relative to expectations of gP.Since it was
widely expected during the l970a that the growth slowdown and the riae in
unemployment would be transitory, it is consistent with the equilibrium
view that these shocks would be accommodated initially by budget deficits.
By the early 1980s, however, it had become clear that the shocks
had considerable persistence (to the point of spawning the new
"hysteresis" theory of unemployment), and many governments began reducing
the budget deficits.In broad terms, the equilibrium approach is much
less successful in accounting for the persistence of budget deficits
throughout the 1980s in many countries. (Remember, as well, that in
almost all countries, the theory fails to account for the steady secular
increase in tax rates from the early 1960s).
The linkage of higher to the post-1973 growth slowdown
arises from several channels.As is described in the detailed fiscal
histories in the IMF's (1982) Fiscal Policy in Twelve Small OECD
Economies, the growth of real government spending in the years just after
1973 was largely "uncontrollable", in the sense that previous spending
commitments based on pre-1973 economic assumptions were politically
difficult to adjust for several years. As a result, when GDP growth fell
after 1973, and government spending continued to increase, the ratio of G
to '1 rose sharply in most countries.The growth of taxes, on the other
hand, slowed along side the slowdown in GDP, leaving the ratio of T to Y
basically unchanged.4 With G/Y increasing faster than the earlier trend,
4.Of course, the failure of T/Y to rise in parallel to G/Y would be
optimal to the extent that the rise in C/I is transitory.17
and T/Y continuing along the earlier trend, large budget deficits
naturally emerged.
This tendency towards a deficit after the slowdown in growth was
exacerbated for two additional reasons. First, many major areas of public
spending (e.g. unemployment compensation, social welfare expenditure,
early retirement benefits, job retraining, subsidies for ailing firms) are
inherently countercyclical, so that portions of Gt actually tend to rise
automatically above prior forecasts when growth slows down below prior
forecasts.This induced rise in tended to be greatest in economies
where the growth slowdown was accompanied by a sharp rise in unemployment,
Ut, since several kinds of social benefits are linked directly to the
unemployed.
Another reason for induced deficits was the intentional
application by some countries of Keynesian aggregate demand policies in
the face of the growth slowdown. The equilibrium model explicitly rejects
the links of or Tt to the level of output and employment via aggregate
demand, but many governments did not (and many still do not) reject those
links. Right or wrong, many governments are loath to raise taxes or lower
government spending during a recession.
As already noted, the large budget deficits that resulted from
the growth slowdown and high unemployment can be viewed as consistent with
the equilibrium model of budget deficits under the assumption that
policymakers believed that C/Y would fall back to the previous trend path.
No doubt, most policymakers thought that at least part of the sharp jump
in G/Y after 1973 would be transitory, since it resulted from a growth
slowdown and rise in unemployment that were themselves viewed as18
transitory for most of the 1970s. The unemployment rates, in particular,
were expected (incorrectly, it turned out) to fall quickly back to the low
levels before 1973, thus directly reducing a considerable part of the
fiscal deficit.
The adverse shocks of slow growth and high unemployment were
aggravated after 1979 by the rise in world real interest rates, which
significantly and unexpectedly raised most governments' costs of debt
servicing.One useful measure of the budgetary costs of higher interest
rates is given by * where A(r.n) signifies the year-to-
year change in the value of r-n .Between1979 and 1981, this measure
rose by several percent of GOP in most of the industrial economies,
thereby greatly adding to the fiscal burden.This rise was particularly
large, of course, in countries such as Belgium, Ireland, and Italy, that
had already accumulated a large stock of debt. As with the unemployment
increase and the growth slowdown, the effects of higher interest rates
have turned Out to be more persistent than many policymakers expected as
of the early l980s.
It would be useful at this point to present a full structural
model of tax and spending adjustments, in order to quantify the effects of
the growth slowdown, the rise in unemployment, and the higher interest
rates, on the emergence of large budget deficits after 1973. The model
could be used to evaluate the extent to which budget deficits have
deviated from the levels predicted by the equilibrium model. Such a task
is unfortunately beyond the scope of the present paper. At a minimum, it
would require a rather sophisticated view about the ex ante expectations
of economic growth, unemployment rates, and interest rates that were held19
by policymakers during the period 1973 to the present. Rather, we attempt
something more modest, to describe the (basic) dynamic response of budget
deficits to the major macroeconomic shocks in a semi-reduced-form
equation.
We estimate a pooled cross-section time-series regression where
the left-hand side variable is the annual deficit, measured as the change
in the debt-GDP ratio, bjt. The basic explanatory variables are: (1) the
lagged deficit, Ab1 t-l (2) the chanee in the unemployment rate,Uj;
(3) the chanre in the GDP growthrate, denoted nj; (4) the change in the
real interest rate minus the growth rate, multiplied by the lagged debt-
CDP ratio, bj*(rt -ne);and (5) a political variable, p, described in
the next section; and (6) an error term, vj. The basic structure of the
pooled regression model is the following (i denotes country, tdenotes
time, and x denotes the change in variable x)




+a +a*p +v. 4 it 5 itit
Accordingto our discussion, we expect that the deficit should
be: a positive function, with a coefficient less than 1.0, of the lagged
deficit (to allow for any slow adjustment of budget deficits); a positive
function of the change in the unemployment rate (since a rise in the
unemployment race raises above gP in the short term); a negative
5.The exact definitions of the variables are given in the data
appendix.20
function of the change in the GDP growth rate (Since a rise in GDP growth
lowers below gP in the short term); a positive function of the change
in the real interest rate, since a rise in r-n directly raises
(rn)bi
which if transitory should be accomodated by a temporary rise in the
budget deficit.
The equation gives a rather successful account of the role of
exogenous shocks in inducing the budget deficits in the industrial
countries, as shown in Column 1 in Table 7. As expected, a rise in
unemployment (denoted by DUB) raises the budget deficit; a rise in the
debt-servicing cost (denoted by DRB) raises the budget deficit; an
acceleration of GDP growth (denoted by DCR) lowers the budget deficit,
indicating that the deceleration of GDP growth after 1973 contributed to
the rise in budget deficits; finally, the lagged deficit enters with a
coefficient of about 0.70, suggesting that about 70 percent of the lagged
budget deficit persists to the next period.(Of course, without a full
stochastic model for growth, unemployment, and interest rates, we can not
easily judge whether the 0.70 is an appropriate speed of adjustment or
not).Note that the variable measuring the slowdown in growth is the
highly significant.Its magnitude suggests that each 1 percentage point
slowdown in GDP growth initially raises the budget deficit relative to GDP
by 0.45 percentage points.Since the average slowdown in growth was on
the order of 3 percentage points, the impact effect was more than 1
percent of GDP.
Section IV. Political Institutions and Deficit Adjustment21
The results in the previous section suggest that the shocks that
hit the macroeconomics of the industrial countries, particularly slower
growth and higher unemployment after 1973, and higher real interest rates
in the 1980s, all contributed to a jump in the budget deficits of the
industrial countries, particularly because the shocks were viewed to be
transitory at the time that they hit. y the early l980s, however, the
growth slowdown and the rise in unemployment were widely understood to be
highly persistent. At that point, some countries began to adjust to these
shocks with strong fiscal consolidation, while in other countries, there
continued to be many years of a steeply rising debt-GDP ratio. The aim of
this section is to show that political factors help to account for rapid
versus slow reductions of budget deficits.Our main finding is that
multi-party coalition governments, especially those with a short expected
tenure, are poor at reducing budget deficits.
Note first from Table 3 the countries that were successfully in
stemming the rise in the net debt to GDP ratio, at least in the 1980s.
Eight countries were able to keep the rise in b to below 10 percentage
points between 1981 and 1985: the U.S., Germany, the U.K. ,Finland,
France, Austria, Japan, and Norway. These countries are characterized by
a majority parliamentary system (the U.K., Austria, Japan), a two-party
coalition (Germany), or a presidential system (the U.S., Finland, France).
Norway is the only multi-party coalition government in the group. The
other Countries in Table 3, which failed to restrain the growth of public
debt, are mostly characterized by proportional representation voting and
multi-party coalitions(thisis true in Italy, Belgium,Ireland,
Netherlands, Sweden at times, and Denmark).22
The data also suggest upon closer inspection an asymmetry in the
link of political structures to budget deficits. Coalition governments are
not inherently prone towards large deficits.During the l960s, no major
differences in budgetary behavior areevident between coalition
governments and majority governments.Rather, it appears that coalition
governments are prone to large deficits in circumstances of highly adverse
macroeconomic shocks. We will attempt to explain this asymmetry later.
To set the empirical basis for the discussion, it is best to
start with an empirical illustration of the basic linkages. We aim to
show that an index variable measuring political structure can help to
explain the evolution of budget deficits when added to the list of
variables already included in equation (13). We create an index denoted
for country i at time t, that measures (in a simple way) the degree of
political cohesion of the national government. The index is constructed
as follows:
Value 0 one-party majority parliamentary government;
or
presidential government, with the same party in the
majority in the executive and legislative branch
1 coalition parliamentary government with 2
coalition partners;
or
presidential government, with different parties in
control of the executive and legislative branch
2 coalition parliamentary government with 3 or
more coalition partners
3 minority parliamentary government
Details on the construction of the index for each particular country are
given in the Data Appendix.23
In entering the political variable, we want to test the proposition
that multi-party coalition governments have a bias towards larger budget
deficits, but perhaps only during periods of macroeconomic stress.
Therefore, we include both (termed POL in Table 7) and *D
(tenned FOLD), where D is a dummy variable equal to 0 during the rapid
growth period 1960-74, and equal to 1 during 1975-85. We expect that the
variable *Dwill be much more important than itself. We also
investigate an interaction term of the political variable with the lagged
deficit (termed DYLPOL), on the view that the a divided political
structure might reduce the speed of adjusting to an inherited level of the
deficit, bitl.
The results of the estimation are shown in columns 2 -4in
Table 7. Several different versions of the regression are shown,
involving different ways of entering the political variable.The basic
point isthe following. The political variable always enters
significantly when interacted with the dummy variable for 1975-86. The
magnitude of the coefficient on this variable, 0.005, signifies that the
difference cet. Dar. between a majority government and a minority
government (p —0versus p —3),is 0.015, or 1.5 percentage points of
added budget deficit per year. (Note that adding the dummy variable
itself for 1975-86, in level form, to the regression does not change any
results, and the dummy variable itself enters insignificantly). Note also
that the interaction term of the political variable with the lagged
deficit (DSYLPOL) is of small magnitude and statistically insignificant.
Whycoalitiongovernments find it hard to balance the budget ?24
Having given some empirical support to the role of the political
variableit is now time to offer some possible explanations of the
observation. In our view, the essence of the budget problem for a
coalition government results from three factors.First, the individual
coalition partners in multi-party governments have distinctive interests
and distinctive constituencies. There is no single uniform objective
function for the various political parties in the government.There is
likely to be a fundamental prisoner's dilemma with respect to budget cuts:
all of the partners of the coalition may prefer comprehensive budget cuts
to a continuation of large deficits, but each coalition partner may have
the incentive to protect its particular part of the budget against the
austerity measures. In the absence of strong coordination between members
of the coalition to produce the "cooperative" outcome, the noncooperative
solution of no-budget-cutting is quite likely to arise.
Second, individual coalition partners will often have enormous
power to prevent a change in the status quo, though they will not
typically have the power by themselves to implement a positive program of
change. In other words, coalition members will have a veto against
change.Even a very small party in a multi-party coalition can have
enormous power by virtue of its ability to break up the government
(formally, small parties may have very large Shapley values). Moreover, a
coalition will typically divide responsibilities over various parts of the
budget among the various members (this is certainly true in part by virtue
of the distribution of ministerial positions among the parties). Third,
the enforcement mechanisms among coalition partners to assure the
cooperative outcome will often be very weak.25
Some of the political weaknesses of coalition governments are
inherent in any legislative environment, as discussed by Weingast and
Marshall (1988) in the context of policy in the U.S. Congress.These
authors stress that trading votes in order to arrive at an efficient
overall budget invariably involve exchanges of benefits that are hard to
monitor and hard to enforce.6 Other problems of enforcement are
particular to the case of multi-party coalition governments. Perhaps most
important, because of the rapid turnover of multi-party coalition
governments, the incentives for cooperation are reduced.As argued by
Axeirod (1984), the enforceability of cooperation depends heavily on the
repeated-play aspects of decision making.To the extent that the rapid
turnover of governments reduces the time horizon for the repeated play
among coalition members, their incentives to cooperate are reduced.
In these circumstances (with coalition members having distinct
spending objectives, veto powers over parts of the budget, and an
inability to make binding commitments with the other coalition members),
adverse shocks to the economy, which require cuts in sDending programs,
can easily result in prolonged excessive budget deficits. Even if all
coalition members would favor an across-the-board cut in spending in order
to reduce a large budget deficit, each coalition member may have the
incentive to block the spending Cuts in its o area, while gladly
6.Weingast and Marshall stress that exchanges of votes will
typically provide a stream of benefits for the traders that is
noncontemporaneous (i.e. one of the voters will benefit earlier than
the others), making a vote-trading deal easier to renege on. Also vote
trades are likely to be noncontemporaneous (one coalition partner must
support the other on the promise that the latter will support the
former at a later date).26
supporting the spending cuts on other parts of the budget. The result is
an obvious prisoner's dilemma: reducing the budget deficit is a public
good among the coalition members.
Note that coalition governments might manage the budget quite
well when overall macroeconomic circumstances are favorable. The point is
simple. Individual coalition members may have the power to !Q spending
cuts, but not have the power to push through spending increases without
the support of the other coalition members. Since the other coalition
members will not generally have the incentive to support excessive
spending increases, the coalition does not have a bias of generating
excessive increases in overall spending, but only insufficient decreases
in spending when spending cuts are needed. There is thus likely to be a
fundamental asymmetry between the budgetary responses to adverse
macroeconomic shocks (which will produce excessive budget deficits) and to
favorable macroeconomic shocks (which will result in appropriate overall
levels of the deficit).
An additional and important point is made by Sir Karl Popper
(1988), who stresses that the electorate can do little to discipline
misbehaving parties in a system of multiple-party coalitions under
proportional representation voting.It might be supposed, for example.
that political parties will cooperate with each other because of the glare
of bad publicity, and subsequent electoral punishment, for parties that
refuse to cooperate. In Popper's view, elections cannot effectively
punish individual parties for the failures of coalition governments in a
PR system, with the result that the critical electoral mechanism for
enforcing good behavior is rendered ineffective.27
Popper puts the issue this way.
While proportional representation is based on the idea that the
influence of a party should be proportional to its voting power, a
coalition government means, more often than not, that small parties
can exercise a disproportionately great -- andoften decisive- -
influence,on the formation of a government and on its resignation,
and so on all its decisions.Most important of all, it means the
decay of responsibility.For in a coalition government there is
reduced responsibility for all the partners in the coalition.
Proportional representation -- andthe greater number of parties as a
result thereof -- maytherefore have a detrimental effect on the
decisive issue of how to get rid of a government by voting it out of
office, for instance in a parliamentary election. The voters are led
to expect that perhaps none of the parties will obtain an absolute
majority. With this expectation in their minds, the people hardly
vote against any of the parties. As a result, on election day none
of the parties is dismissed, none is convicted. Accordingly, nobody
looks on election day as a day of judgement.
The loss of 5% or 10% of votes by one or other of the parties is not
seen by the voters as a verdict of "guilty". They look at it,
rather, as a temporary fluctuation in popularity. In time, the
people become used to the idea that none of the political parties or
their leaders can really be made accountable for their decisions
which may have been forced on them by necessity to form a coalition.
Of course, all of these problems of coordinating austerity
measures are present, to some extent, in all types of democratic
governments. The U.S. Congress is in some ways like a multi-party
coalition government, given the enormous variety of regional, sectoral,
and other special interests that are organized into powerful factions in
the Congress. The specific party discipline of the Democrats and
Republicans is often very low.It is our assumption, however, that the
problems are typically exacerbated by the need to mesh the interests of
many parties in a single government.An individual majority party has
many crucial powers and constraints that allow it to come closer to
enforcing "good behavior".
A case study: France in the Fourth Republic28
To further illuminate the underlying mechanisms behind our
findings, and to bolster the case that they in fact reflect actual
phenomena, we examine one historical case in some detail, a case that is
as close to a pure laboratory experiment as we could find.After World
War II until 1958, the French political regime (known as the Fourth
Republic)was a parliamentary system with multi-party coalition
governments. The political system was widely regarded as a failure. In
1958, de Gaulle became Prime Minister and was given extraordinary powers.
At the end of the year, a new constitution was voted (the Fifth Republic),
which created a presidential system. We examine the budgetary
implications of that change in political regime.2
As a reaction to the authoritarian regimes of the World War II
period, the Fourth Republic was formed in 1946 in the form of a
proportional representation (PR) political system. The PR electoral laws
led to a very fractionalized party structure and the need to form
coalition governments.The resulting governments were multi-party
coalitions of the center and right, with very different ideologies, and
economic and political agendas. The instability of the resulting
governments was notorious: during 1946-1958, there were 26 different
governments, with an average tenure of 6 months!
The rivalries between the parties led to an ineffectual budget
process, leading to the term "immobilisme" to characterize the political
system and the economic management.As seen in Table 8 ,largebudget
deficits resulted from the lack of cohesion of the various coalition
7.This section relies heavily on Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., France.
Troubled Ally: De Gaulle's heritage and DrosDects, New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1960, for the Council on Foreign Relations.29
governments, which were subjected to pressures for increased spending on
patronage and local projects. The war in Vietnam was a major source of
expenditure until 1954. but the growth of spending and the size of the
deficits remained very large even after the end of the French military
involvement in Vietnam (the defense burden did remain large, however,
because of the deteriorating situation in Algeria).
Furniss (1960) describes the budgetary process in the Fourth
Republic as follows:
Getting the cabinet to agree on a budget was frequently painful, but
this was only the beginning of a French premier's ordeal. He had
still to fight the budget, item by item, through any number of
National Assembly committees, beating back amendments and even
complete substitutes, almost all of which would seek to increase
expenditures.Finally if he had not fallen on some other issue, he
had to maneuver for a series of favorable votes in the Assembly, on
each of which his cabinet's life was at stake.(pp. 157-158).
The budget ordeal in 1958, on the eve of the collapse of the Fourth
Republic, is symptomatic:
Bourges-Maunoury fell on the Algerian question before his budget
could come to a vote. Stepping up from Finance Minister to Premier,
Gaillard tried to push through the same budget on the theory that
deputies will sometimes accept disagreeable policies after a premier
has first been sacrificed. As his shaky government tottered towards
the abyss, pressures to restore the Cuts rose rather than diminished.
y the time Pflimlin appeared on the scene, the Right, having caused
the collapse of three governments within the year, was all set to
attack that portion of the budget allocated to national defense .
InJune 1958, when de Gaulle assumed power, the budget still had not
been voted (p. 158)
The Fourth Republic disintegrated in 1958 submerged under the
mounting political, economic and diplomatic crises of the system. De
Gaulle came to power in June 1958 with the power to rule by decree for six
months.A new Constitution was written, approved by referendum in
September, and made effective in October.Dc Gaulle cameintopower as30
president in January 1959.De Gaulle irxunediately attacked the budget
deficit, completing the 1958 budget by decree. In early 1959, he
announced an emergency program of "truth and austerity" aimed at cutting
drastically the budget deficit.250 different economic ordinances were
issued by decree between January and February 1959. The program included
both increases in revenues and reductions in expenditures.8 As shown in
Table 8, the budget deficit that had averaged 4.7 percent of GDP per year
during 1950-58, and was 4.9 percent of GDP in 1957, fell to 2.8 percent in
1958, 2.4 percent of GDP in 1959, and 1.4 percent of GDP in 1960 and 1961.
In 1965, the budget was in balance, and the budget was in substantial
surplus during 1970 and 1972-74.
We have attempted to test statistically for the effect of the
political transition by estimating a budget deficit equation for France
over the post-war period. The main reason for the estimating a regression
equation is to control for other factors (particularly temporary shifts in
government expenditure) that might have been influencing the size of the
budget deficits during the transition period.The most important set of
factors includes the high and declining level of military spending in the
l950s (tied to the French Indochina War, the Algerian War, the NATO
8.On the revenue side 313 billion francs were raised with
increased tax rates for corporate profits, higher tax rates on personal
income at all levels, increases of taxes on tobacco, alcohol, wine and
distilled spirits by between 20 percent and 100 percent; greater levies
on intermediate and final goods. On the spending side, a wide range of
expenditures and subsidies were abolished or reduced, with savings of
245 billion francs.31
buildup) (MIL), post-war reconstruction expenditures (WARDAM) and a dummy
variable for the Fourth Republic The basic equation is as follows:9
Sample: 1947-1972 R2 —0.83 D.W. —127
DEF —-0.49+0.28MIL +0.48WARDAM -0.67USAID +2.91FOtJRREP
(0.74) (2.54) (1.30) (2.33) (3.43)
Sample: 1950-1972 R2 —0.92 D.W. —1.55
DEF —-2.05+0.60MIL. +0.28WARDAM -0.88USAID +2.23FOURREP
(4.03) (6.53) (1.09) (4.59) (3.48)
The estimated equations show the significant role of temporary military
expenditures (MIL) in affecting the French fiscal deficits during the
period considered but also confirm the structural break in the deficits
between the Fourth and the Fifth Republic: the Fourth Republic dummy is
significant and its value suggests an average reduction in fiscal deficits
of over 2% of GD? between the Fourth and the Fifth Republic.
Many other possible case studies come to mind in addition to the
French experience.We hope to examine some of these other cases in more
detail in later work. Some obviously fruitful cases for political
analysis include: Italy, with decades of chronically weak coalition
governments; Belgium, with weak coalition governments with parties that
are divided along linguistic and geographical lines as well as ideological
lines.; and the U.S., with divided responsibility between Republican
9.The definitions of the variables, and the data sources, are as
follows: DEF —CentralGovernment Budget Deficit; MIL —TotalMilitary
Expenditures; WARDAM Expenditures for War Damages; USAID —Grantsfrom
the United States; FOURREP —Dummyvariableequal to 1 during the Fourth
Republic and 0 otherwise. All budget data are expressed as a share of GDP
and are taken from: Ministere de L'Economje et des Finances Statistigues
& Etudes Financieres ,SpecialIssue, 1974.32
control of the White House during the l980s, and Democratic Party control
of one or both houses of the Congress during the same period. On the
other side are fascinating case studies of successful budget deficit
reduction in the l980s. Surely the most impressive case in this regard is
Japan, where the ruling Liberal Democratic Party -- withits unbroken
majority control -- hasbeen able to announce, implement, and follow
through on a multi-year plan of deficit reduction that was begun in 1981.
Part IV. Conclusions
Our conclusions may be succinctly stated. We have found little
evidence to support the equilibrium model of fiscal policy, which assumes
that taxes are set over time in order to minimize the excess burden of
taxation. Tax rates do not seem to be smoothed, and budget deficits in
many countries appear to be too large to explain by appeal to transitory
increases in government spending.
In most of the countries, deficits were small before the
slowdown in OECD growth after 1973.During 1960-73, most of the OECD
economies experienced falling or very gently rising debt-GDP ratios, With
the growth slowdown and with the rise in unemployment, the ratio of
government spending to GDP increased markedly and beyond expectation,
producing significant budget deficits, and sharply rising ratios of debt
to CDP in several countries. This process was greatly exacerbated by the
sharp rise in real interest rates after 1979.To the extent that the
bulge in the ratio of C to CDP was temporary, it would be appropriate to
run budget deficits during the period in which G/Y falls back to more
normal levels. It appears, however, that the size of the actual deficits33
in most of the countries is too large to be accounted for by this
transitional phenomenon.
We suggest that in several countries, the slow rate at which the
post- '73 fiscal deficits were reduced resulted from the difficulties of
political management in coalition governments. During the period 1975-85,
there is a clear tendency for larger deficits in weaker governments, where
weakness is indicated by a short average tenure of government and by the
presence of many political parties in the coalition. In the final section
of the paper we illustrate the problems of budgetary management with
coalition governments, first in two case studies, and then in a simple
theoretical model. The greatest difficulties appear to arise because
small coalition partners have veto power over changes in the status quo.34
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Data Appen4kx
Government Expenditures:General government expendituresincluding
interest payments on net debt corrected for inflation and growth. Data on
expenditures from OECD National Income Accounts (OECD NIA)
Governments Revenues: General government revenues from OECD NIA.
GDP: Gross Domestic Dutput from DECD NIA.
Government Debt: General Government Net Debt. OECD data.
Inflation Rate: Base on GDP deflators from DECD NIA. For regressions in
Table 5 CPI inflation rates from IMF-IFS are used
Unemployment Rates: Standardized Unemployment Rates. OECD Main Economic
Indicators.
Average Tenure of a government: Variable created with data on national
governments in "Political Parties of Europe" ed. by V. MdHale and S.
Skowronski, Greenwood Press, 1983; "The Europa Yearbook", 1987.
BY: Net debt to GD? ratio.
DBY : Change in net debt to GD? ratio.
DBYL: DBY(t-l).
DGR : Change in GD? growth rate —Growthin GD? at time t minus an average
of GD? growth rates in the previous three years.
DUB : Change in the unemployment rate —Unemploymentrate at time t minua
an average of unemployment rates in the previous eight years.
?OL : Index of ?olitical Cohesion. Described in detail below.
POLD: ?OL multiplied by a dummy variable for the 1975-1985 period.
DEYLPOL: POL * DBYL.39
DUJAP : DUB times a dummy variable equal to 1 for Japan.
ORB:-(r5 -n)BY (t-l) where re —- ,e —interestpayments on
government debt divided by gross general government debt; it— weighted
average of inflation rates at time t and 3 lagged periods; n —weighted
average of GDP growth rates at time t and 3 lagged periods.
Description of POL variable.
POL Index of the Political Cohesion of the National Government.
UnitedFranceGermanyJapan United Austria Belgium
States Kingdom
1960 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1961 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1962 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1963 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1964 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1965 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1966 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
1967 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
1968 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
1969 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1970 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1971 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1972 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1973 1 1 1 0 0 0 2
1974 1 1 1 0 0 0 2
1975 1 1 1 0 0 0 2
1976 1 1 1 0 0 0 2
1977 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
1978 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
1979 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
1980 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
1981 1 1 1 0 0 0 2
1982 1 1 1 0 0 0 2
1983 1 1 1 0 0 1 2
1984 1 1 1 0 0 1 2
1985 1 1 1 0 0 1 2Denmark Finland Italy
40
Netherlanda NorwaySwedenIreland
1 1 3 2
1 1 3 2
1 1 2 2
1 1 3 2
O 1 2 2
0 1 2 2
0 1 2 1
0 1 2 2
2 1 3 2
2 1 1 2
2 1 2 2
0 1 2 2
3 1 3 2
3 1 2 2
3 1 3 2
3 1 3 2
3 1 3 2
3 1 3 2
1 1 3 2
3 1 3 2
3 1 2 2
3 1 2 2
3 1 2 3
3 1 2 2
2 1 2 2
2 1 2 2
Source: Data on




























Note: France and Finland are given a score of 1 for being presidential regimes
where coalition governments are usually formed. The United States is given a
score of 1 when there is divided power (different parties in control of the



























national governments in "Political Parties of Europe"














































1961-1964 - - - -
1965-1969 - - - -
1971-1974 41.5 46.8 -2.70 -13.6
1975-1979 46.9 48.2 3.08 1.8
1980-1985 52.9 53.6 5.56 35.2
Finland
1961-1964 - - - -
1965-1969 - - - -
1971-1974 31.2 35.7 -1.37 -10.5
1975-1979 35.8 38.6 0.74 -6.8
























1965-1969 - - - -
1971-1974 34.1 35.2 0.50 37.1
1975-1979 34.7 36.0 5.56 64.9
1980-1985 42.2 41.6 6.35 103.0
Italy
1961-1964 - - 24.7
1965-1969 30.9 30.7 2.00 36.7
1970-1974 30.0 30.6 2.50 49.2
1975-1979 32.4 34.0 2.90 63.7
1980-1985 43.0 42.0 5.43 96.3
Japan
1961-1965 - - - -
1966-1969 17.0 19.4 0.02 -5.5
1970-1974 21.3 22.1 0.03 -5.3
1975-1979 26.7 24.6 4.04 14.9
1980-1985 28.8 29.6 1.94 26.5
Norway
1961-1964 - - - -
1965-1969 - - - -
1971-1974 41.4 482 -1.08 -1.8
1975-1979 46.8 51.0 3.72 16.8
1980-1985 43.8 53.9 -5.96 -19.0Netherlands
1961-1964 - - - -
1965-1969 - - - -
1971-1974 40.5 45.1 -2.47 19.0
1975-1979 49.1 50.3 0.56 21.8
1980-1985 55.5 54.0 3.30 41.6
Sweden
1961-1964 - - - -
1965-1969 - - - -
1971-1.974 43.9 48.8 -1.52 -30.1
1975-1979 52.9 55.5 2.06 -19.8
1980-1985 56.5 58.7 5.86 15.4
United States
1961-1964 23.9 26.4 -1.65 38.3
1965-1969 24.8 27.6 -2.01 28.3
1970-1974 26.9 29.2 -1.20 22.2
1975-1979 27.6 29.6 -0.49 19.8
1980-1985 30.5 31.0 1.22 27.1
United Kingdom
1961-1964 25.9 31.7 -6.39 102.6
1965-1969 30.6 36.1 -4.09 82.1
1970-1974 31.0 39.0 -5.44 54.9
1975-1979 33.1 39.8 -1.24 48.7
1980-1985 41.0 43.1 -0.21 47.4
Source: OECD National Income Accounts for expenditures and revenues. OECD data
for net public debt.Table 2. Basic data on deficits and governments. 1975-1985.
CountryChange in Debt/GDP Average Tenure Typical Form of the
Ratio (per year) of Governments Political Regime
(in percent) (in years)
Belgium 6.16 1.0 Multi-Party
Coalitions
Ireland 5.80 2.2 Small Coalitions
Denmark 4.53 1.5 Multi-Party
Coalitions
Sweden 4.41 1.5 Small Coalitions
Italy 3.65 1.2 Multi-Party
Coalition
Japan 2.86 11.0 Single Party
Majority
Austria 2.34 5.5 Single Party
Maj ority
Netherlands 2.19 1.8 Multi-Party
Coalitions
Germany 2.12 5.5 Two-Party Coalitions
Finland 1.00 1.5 Presidential with
Coalition Governments
France 0.57 3.6 Presidential with
Coalition Governments
UnitedStates 0.25 3.6 Presidential with
Divided Legislature
United Kingdom -0.97 5.5 Single Party
Majority
Norway -1.97 3.6 Single Party Majority
or Small Coalitions
Source: See Data AppendixTable 3. General Government Net Debt to GDP ratio. 15 OECD countries.
1960-1986
YEAR US GERMANYFRANCE UK ITALYCANADABELGIUMIRELAND
1960 65.0 -13.2 29.1 123.2 na na 82.3 na
1961 44.7 -15.4 25.8 120.9 na 21.8 80.0 na
1962 42.5 -15.5 22.2 116.1 na 20.7 76.8 na
1963 40.4 -13.3 19.9 109.2 na 20.9 74.5 na
1964 38.3 -14.8 18.0 102.6 26.7 18.9 68.9 na
1965 35.3 -12.8 16.1 96.7 30.2 16.7 66.6 na
1966 32.5 -11.9 15.0 92.5 34.2 15.3 65.1 na
1967 32.4 -10.1 14.6 92.4 34.1 15.2 63.3 na
1968 30.7 -8.8 14.8 86.8 36,9 13.2 62.2 na
1969 28.3 -8.9 13.4 82.1 36.7 9.2 59.2 na
1970 27.8 -8.1 11.4 74.8 39.1 6.1 55.5 35.7
1971 27.9 -7.1 11.0 70.1 43.9 4.6 54.6 35.1
1972 25.8 -5.7 9.1 65.3 49.9 4.2 52.6 33.2
1973 23.0 -6.7 8.3 57.9 52.0 2.6 50.9 32.0
1974 22.2 -4.7 8.7 54.9 49.2 1.1 47.5 37.1
1975 24.6 1.0 11.1 57.2 59.8 4.3 49.8 45.9
1976 24.4 4.6 10.9 56.0 60.8 5.2 50.1 51.6
1977 23.3 7.0 10.2 55.7 60.7 7.5 53.7 50.6
1978 21.3 9.4 10.2 53.4 63.8 10.3 57.5 56.3
1979 19.8 11.5 9.7 48.7 63.7 10.9 61.7 64.9
1980 19.8 14.4 9.1 48.1 61.8 11.6 69.0 69.4
1981 19.1 17.5 9.9 47.2 66.8 10.8 81.5 75.1
1982 21.7 19.8 11.3 46.6 73.4 17.0 89.2 81.2
1983 24.4 21.4 13.4 47.2 80.6 20.5 99.4 88.0
1984 25.4 21.8 15.2 48.9 87.8 24.9 104.3 94.6
1985 27.1 22.2 16.8 47.4 96.3 30.5 111.2103.0
1986 28.7 22.1 18.2 46.5 99.2 33.7 113.3 naYEAR FINLANDAUSTRIA NETHERL SWEDEN NORWAYJAPANDENMARK
1960 na na na na na na na
1961 na na na na na na na
1962 na na na na na na na
1963 na na na na na na na
1964 na na na na na na na
1965 na na na na na -5.6 na
1966 na na na na na -5.6 na
1967 na na na na na -7.0 na
1968 na na na na na -6.3 na
1969 na na na na na -5.5 na
1970 -5.0 19.4 28.9 -24.0 2.5 -6.5 -2.8
1971 -7.3 18.2 27.7 -27.5 2.6 -7.2 -5.9
1972 -8.0 17.5 24.5 -29.5 0.6 -6.5 -9.0
1973 -10.7 17.5 21.0 -31.1 -1.4 -6.1 -12.2
1974 -10.5 17.6 19.0 -30.1 -1.8 -5.3 -13.6
1975 -9.5 23.9 19.7 -28.7 0.7 -2.1 -10.1
1976 -10.5 27.4 20.3 -29.7 3.5 1.9 -7.7
1977 -9.9 30.0 19.2 -28.8 9.5 5.5 -5.0
1978 -8.3 33.8 20.0-25.3 14.0 11.3 -2.1
1979 -6.8 35.9 21.8 -19.8 16.8 14.9 1.8
1980 -6.0 37.1 24.9 -13.5 6.9 17.3 7.2
1981 -4.6 39.2 27.3 -5.2 3.9 20.6 16.5
1982 -1.8 41.6 31.3 4.4 1.3 23.2 26.3
1983 0.4 46.4 36.5 10.5 -2.4 26.2 34.1
1984 0.7 47.8 38.3 12.6 -9.6 27.0 37.5
1985 0.6 47.3 41.6 15.4-19.0 26.5 35.2
1986 0.0 47.7 46.0 14.5 -24.4 26.3 28.4
Source: OECD Data.Table 4. General Government Revenues as a share of GDP. 1960-1965.
Year United Japan GermanyFrance United Italy Canada
States Kingdom
1960 0.263 NA 0.350 0.349 0.300 0.288 0.260
1961 0.263 NA 0.362 0.362 0.312 0.282 0.263
1962 0.265 NA 0.365 0.363 0.328 0.291 0.266
1963 0.270 NA 0.367 0.371 0.314 0.295 0.263
1964 0.259 NA 0.362 0.380 0.315 0.306 0.272
1965 0.259 0.197 0.355 0.384 0.331 0.301 0.276
1966 0.267 0.191 0.361 0.384 0.343 0.301 0.288
1967 0.271 0.193 0.367 0.382 0.362 0.310 0.303
1968 0.287 0.196 0.378 0.388 0.376 0.316 0.317
1969 0.299 0.196 0.393 0.398 0.395 0.307 0.337
1970 0.289 0.207 0.383 0.390 0.412 0.304 0.342
1971 0.282 0.216 0.394 0.383 0.391 0.311 0.347
1972 0.293 0.215 0.398 0.382 0.375 0.309 0.352
1973 0.296 0.225 0.422 0.386 0.368 0.304 0.349
1974 0.303 0.245 0.427 0.394 0.406 0.306 0.372
1975 0.288 0.240 0.427 0.403 0.413 0.312 0.361
1976 0.295 0.236 0.440 0.425 0.404 0.329 0.358
1977 0.297 0.247 0.450 0.424 0.399 0.343 0.361
1978 0.299 0.245 0.447 0.423 0.385 0.360 0.357
1979 0.305 0.263 0.444 0.437 0.393 0.357 0.355
1980 0.308 0.276 0.447 0.455 0.410 0.378 0.362
1981 0.316 0.291 0.448 0.462 0.431 0.393 0.385
1982 0.311 0.295 0.454 0.471 0.442 0.420 0.390
1983 0.307 0.298 0.451 0.477 0.432 0.450 0.387
1984 0.307 0.304 0.454 0.485 0.437 0.442 0.389
1985 0.311 0.312 0,454 0.485 0.437 0.441 0.389Year Denmark Finland Netherlands Norway SwedenIreland Austria Belgium
Source: OECD National Income Accounts
1960 NA 0.297 NA 0.331 NA NA 0.344 0.275
1961 NA 0.285 NA 0.342 NA NA 0.361 0.284
1962 NA 0.297 0.308 0.355 0.354 NA 0.372 0.292
1963 NA 0.290 0.323 0.355 0.361 NA 0.369 0.294
1964 NA 0.307 0.325 0.360 0.363 NA 0.379 0.300
1965 NA 0,316 0.355 0.368 0.390 NA 0.385 0.307
1966 NA 0.328 0.356 0.383 0.407 NA 0.393 0.324
1967 NA 0.346 0.365 0.405 0.428 NA 0.391 0.332
1968 NA 0.348 0.419 0.411 0.459 NA 0.389 0.338
1969 NA 0.338 0.427 0.433 0.469 NA 0.396 0.343
1970 NA 0.341 0.420 0.435 0.466 0.353 0.3970352
19710.464 0.357 0.433 0.466 0.494 0.363 0.405 0.357
19720.459 0.354 0.445 0.484 0.495 0.349 0.411 0.355
19730.468 0.360 0.459 0.496 0.477 0.345 0.419 0.364
19740.484 0.357 0.470 0.485 0.488 0.352 0.425 0.377
19750.461 0.378 0.492 0.496 0.505 0.346 0.429 0.404
19760.469 0.410 0.495 0.509 0.551 0.379 0.424 0.402
19770.476 0.403 0.505 0.510 0.580 0.364 0.437 0.416
19780.496 0.380 0.509 0.520 0.575 0.352 0.462 0.424
19790.508 0.360 0.514 0.519 0.564 0.359 0.458 0.431
19800.522 0.359 0.528 0.542 0.566 0.388 0.464 0.428
19810.521 0.376 0.535 0.528 0.583 0.396 0.478 0.436
19820.512 0.375 0.538 0.532 0.589 0.417 0.467 0.453
19830.536 0.375 0.553 0.531 0.599 0.439 0.463 0.447
19840.559 0.391 0.543 0.544 0.596 0.443 0.472 0.460
19850.570 0.405 0.544 0.561 0.594 0.445 0.477 0.465Table 5. Tests of Tax Rates as a Random Walk without Drift.
Dependent Variable: Change in the Revenue to GDP ratio.























Norway 0.009 * 0.012*
(4.38) (5.15)
Netherlands 0.006 * 0.013*
(3.29) (2.78)
Sweden 0.007 * 0.011*
(2.56) (2.43)
10United States 0.002 0.002
(1.29) (1.10)
United Kingdom 0.005 0.005
(1.89) (1.28)
Note: t-ststistics in parentheses.
NA: Not available for lack of data points.
*:Null hypothesis of zero drift rejected at the 5% level.
**:Fora few countries the sample does not go back to 1960 for lack of data.
Source: OECD National Income Accounts.
11Table 6. Test of the Theory of Optimal Seignorage. 15 OECD countries.
Dependent Variable: Inflation Rate.
Independent Variables:
Country Time Trend Governnienr Revenues
























(3.43) (2.76)Sweden -0.002 0.40
(0.84) (1.37)
United Kingdom 0.0008 0.55
(0.25) (0.92)
United States -0.001 1.91
(0.84) (2.68)
Source: IMF-IFS for inflation rates. OECD National Income Accounts for general
government revenues.
t-statistics in parentheses.Table 7. Panel data regression of deficits with political variables.
Dependent Variable: D8Y.
Variable Equation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DBYL 0.74 0.70 0.66 0.68
(16.8) (15.9) (9.36) (15.2)
0.21 0.16 0.15 0.10
(2.72) (2.05) (1.93) (1.32)
DRB 0.76 0.82 0.86 0.76
(3.09) (3.36) (3.47) (3.12)
DC?. -0.46 -0.45 -0.45 -0.44
(8.37) (8.18) (8.18) (8.04)
DUJAP 1.80 2.74 3.02 2.77
(1.45) (2.11) (2.31) (2.21)
POL - 0.004 0.004 0.001
(2.84) (2.74) (0.55)
POLD - - - 0.005
(2.11)
DBYLPOL - - 0.03 -
(0.88)
R2 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.68
Data Source: See Appendix.







































Note: De Gaulle came to power in July 1958 and the new constitution was
promulgated in January 1959.